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Thrasymachus insisted that while justice benefits others it is always bad for its possessor: being just and acting justly makes one worse off in the long run. The prisoners are unable to see these puppets, the real objects, that pass behind them. This is not as a matter of internal or external causation, but rather of rational compulsion: the force of rational persuasion. The text here has puzzled many editors, and it has been frequently emended. Special circumstances are required for refraining from violence to be praiseworthy, as envisioned in a Sopranos episode when Tony, a violence-prone mafioso, forgoes killing his daughter's sexually predatory soccer coach and lets the police deal with it. The returning enlightened philosopher will free whom he can, dragging those who are able to follow 'up the rough, steep path' (7.515e), but their main task is to govern in the Cave—to guard and care for the others' (7.520a). Although Plato could have had Socrates just say this simply and directly, it is more powerful and more aesthetically pleasing for readers to see this for themselves. But the self-interested Thrasymachus, who is 'vicious but clever' (7.519a), is unlikely to be persuaded: the philosopher would clearly be better off if they missed a turn every once in a while, if they called in sick when they really wanted a day of metaphysical sun-bathing. The philosopher who does not go back down to the cave would be unjust, but under the terms agreed to they would not appear to be so; their free-riding would have to go unnoticed and thus would not undermine the norms governing the small community of philosophers, so their not going back down to the cave to rule benefits them without the negative effect on norms of justice. Plato's aim in the Republic is to describe what is necessary for us to achieve this reflective understanding. Who are the puppeteers? Although it is clearly related to the Sun and Divided Line analogies (indeed, Socrates explicitly connects the Cave and the Sun at 7.517bc), Plato marks its special status by opening Book VII with it, emphasizing its importance typographically, so to speak (he will do much the same thing in Book IX with the discussion of the tyrannical soul). But Kant did not share Socrates' view that doing the right thing makes me better off all things considered: the demands of morality are frequently at odds with those of self-interest and happiness. At stage five, the former cave dweller is able to look directly at the sun, "not images of it in water or some alien place, but the sun itself, in its own place, and be able to study it" (7.516b). It is a comfortable disease, to borrow a phrase from e. Now perhaps free-riding would not even tempt the fully just philosopher, who takes their turn at ruling without complaint. This is not the only time Plato connects education with compulsion, with being forced to turn one's head and gain a new perspective. If we take the good they would do by governing, which is presumably substantial, since there can be no real happiness for the citizens if philosophers do not rule (5.473e), and subtract from it the personal cost to them of sacrificing their own preferences for the good of the group, the net consequences of descending would still be overall better than those of not descending. Plato gives his answer at line (515b2). And perhaps this is how the two-worlds metaphysics should be interpreted even if the Powers Argument were sound: think of the Forms populating the intelligible realm (and that realm itself) as useful fictions. So perhaps Socrates does not give away the game to Thrasymachus after all. The philosopher's return benefits the cave's residents, since 'there can be no happiness, either public or private' in any city not governed by a philosopher-king or -queen (5.473e). While ruling seems at first to belong to the category of goods that are 'onerous but beneficial' (2.357c), upon reflection we can see that it does not really fit there, since this mixed category contains goods that are 'onerous but beneficial to us' (my emphasis). Donating a kidney to a stranger is, other things being equal, praiseworthy, but my not doing this is not blameworthy: I do not act unjustly if I keep both of my kidneys. First, while my hand is a three-dimensional object, the shadow is only two-dimensional, lacking the dimension of depth. As I hinted earlier, Socrates does not argue that any enlightened philosopher has a duty to descend to the cave and govern. Now on to the substantive philosophical question of the enlightened philosopher's return to the cave. Glaucon says toward the outset that these are 'strange prisoners', to which Socrates replies, 'they are like us' (7.515a), so with a bit of imagination we can fill in some of these blank spots. So it looks like justice does not benefit its possessor: leading a good life seems to come at the cost of having a good life. On this view, the two worlds are ways of thinking about or conceptualizing reality rather than assertions about the nature of reality itself. It is no accident that their being compelled upward would be metaphorically physical, since our particular individual bodies belong in the visible realm of particulars, while our souls, by contrast, are not physical, so there is nothing to drag. The Powers Argument was supposed to provide some reason for believing in Plato's two-worlds metaphysics and indeed for taking the Metaphysical Elevator to the fourth floor, where the Forms are not just real but are more real than the particulars that instantiate them. Early in Book X he recounts his 'usual procedure', which is to 'hypothesize a single form in connection with each of the many things to which we apply the same name' (10.596a). A problem with the metaphorical interpretation, however, is that Plato himself seems to take the two worlds literally: 'there are these two things [i.e., the Form of the good and the sun], one sovereign of the intelligible kind and place, the other of the visible' (6.509d). Even if the overall consequences of the philosopher's returning were better than the consequences of their remaining above, their return would not benefit them. At first, they will only be able to look at shadows of the objects in the world above, here cast by the light of the sun rather than the fire, or their reflections in water, or look at the objects at night. Your supposed duty to return the favor would look flimsier and flimsier. So when the prisoners talk, what are they talking about? by Gail Fine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. Integrative thinking is one of the hallmarks of dialectic, and one can prize that capacity while at the same time denying that the Forms exist mind-independently. Somehow, 'political power and philosophy [must be made to] entirely coincide' (5.473cd). So what is the argument that the enlightened philosophers should find so compelling? What the prisoners see and hear are shadows and echoes cast by objects that they do not see. There is a large literature on Plato's Allegory of the Cave. The same might be said for the returning philosopher, who lives a better life in a well-governed city than they do in the poorly governed city of the Shelter from the Storm analogy, which we considered in the last chapter. (Of course, if I have promised to donate the kidney and the stranger has relied on my promise, then 'other things' are not equal, and the moral situation has changed considerably.) Actions required by justice are different: failure to perform them is blameworthy, and, other things being equal, performing them is not praiseworthy. We know they will not be received well, but if through 'some chance event' or divine intervention (6.499b) they are able to take charge of the cave, they will govern well, since they have the virtue needed to do so: political wisdom. He seems to believe that the Forms are real, but perhaps this remark is Plato's way of indicating that he is aware of the Powers Argument's shortcomings: Socrates himself does not think he has proven the argument's conclusion. And because you have seen the truth about fine, just, and good things, you'll know each image for what it is and also that of which it is the image. Their being compelled downward is mental or psychic, but it is not the irrational or non-rational compulsion that consists in brainwashing or advertising by people who seek to cause us to pursue ends they have chosen for us. I suspect you would feel a bit manipulated. p. When Glaucon worries that justice is 'making them live a worse life when they could live a better one' (7.519d), Socrates does not reply that they are better off acting justly; instead, he replies the response he made to Adeimantus at the beginning of Book IV: his concern is not 'to make any class [of particular citizens] in the city outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city' (7.519e; compare 4.419a and 5.466a), which concedes the assessment underlying Glaucon's question. (These are the 'both types of life' referred to in the quotation above.) Plausible though the argument is, there is something troubling about duties of gratitude, even when the benefit to be reciprocated was bestowed intentionally, for the sake of the beneficiary. If I show up unbidden and start harvesting your wheat for you, does my supererogatory act really bind you to do the same for me? Plato does his readers a good turn by having Socrates explicitly connect the Sun and Cave metaphors (7.5157bc), but he leaves the task of fitting together the Divided Line and Cave to us. They will return because, being just, they will do what justice requires of them, even when they do not want to do it. And suppose that your neighbor harvested your wheat when you were away in town on Saturday, without asking if you needed or wanted their help. Who drags them up and out of the cave? Cummings, for it is a world the cave-dweller is familiar with and comfortable in. Thus, for you and for us, the city will be governed, not like the majority of cities nowadays, by people who fight over shadows and struggle against one another in order to rule [...] but by people who are awake rather than dreaming (7.520bc) This is an interesting argument, and it certainly has a lot of intuitive appeal. Screens—television screens, phone screens, computer screens—are the Cave walls of today. Unlike the Cave's puppeteers, who do not seem to derive any benefit from their shadow-casting, the shadow-casters of our age typically do derive some benefit, and frequently their power depends upon our remaining chained, accepting the images they project before us, and believing that 'the truth is nothing other than the shadows' (7.515e). In fact, we might be worse off if we fall prey to the belief that critical thinking involves (merely) rejecting—perhaps as 'fake news'—anything emanating from sources we identify as 'liberal' or 'conservative' or whatever. Given how visual the allegory is, many readers will find it helpful to draw themselves a diagram of it. It is no wonder that, having discovered the other three political virtues (wisdom, courage, moderation), Socrates finds justice hard to locate at first: "the place seems to be impenetrable and full of shadows [...] dark and hard to search" (4.432c). They can only look straight ahead, and thus have only one perspective on what they see on the cave's wall. There is much that Plato leaves unsaid about the Cave. The trouble with Socrates' argument is that the city's actions in educating the philosopher too closely resemble the 'helpful' neighbor harvesting your wheat. Consider how your views would change if the helpful harvester helped not primarily because he wanted to benefit you, but because he needed your help harvesting his large wheat field, and, knowing you to be a 'nice' person but not wanting to ask for your help, decided that the best way to get you to help him was to help you. To see it, he would have to turn his head around. Photograph by Crystallizedcarbon (2015), Wikimedia, CC BY-SA 3.0. Plato Cave Wikipedia.gif#media/File:Plato Cave Wikipedia.gif © Sean McAleer, CC BY 4.0 The Allegory of the Cave is arguably the most famous part of the Republic. This metaphysically more cautious view would appeal to fans of Occham's Razor. They return to the cave to govern, but they would rather not, since they would be personally better off ignoring the demands of justice. There is something compelling, after all, about obligations of gratitude: if you have gone out of your way to benefit me, I seem to incur a debt of gratitude. Plato is not suggesting that the images, shadows, and reflections are not real, but rather that they are less real than the originals they are images of. These are some of the issues readers will want to keep in mind as we explore Books VIII and IX, where Socrates resumes his investigation of the Republic's second question. In doing my part to uphold norms that benefit the community, the burden of compliance might be counter-balanced by the benefit received. This has a lot of intuitive appeal: I can create a shadow of my hand by interposing it between my desk and lamp, but the shadow cast seems less real than my hand in at least a couple of ways. 235-54. Here, Socrates argues that, as a matter of justice, the enlightened philosophers must (temporarily, at least) give up the life they prefer—a philosophical life devoted to contemplating the Forms—for a life of political activity. They will learn to think abstractly, grasping the essences and integrating Forms, which is presumably why studying geometry "tends to make it easier to see the Form of the good" (7.526d). An important point to grasp is that the liberated philosopher is not on a mission of liberation, at least not complete liberation, since on Plato's view not everyone is capable of making it out of the cave. Mathematicians and scientists study the Forms relevant to their disciplines, but they do not see other Forms or how the Forms they contemplate are related to these other Forms, and they certainly do not see the Form of the good—that vision is reserved for genuine philosophers, and there are very few of them. Just as they were compelled to ascend out of the cave, they are compelled to descend into it, but the compulsion in the two cases is different. The Greek word at issue is καταβαίνεν (katabainein), to go down. 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The philosophers would prefer to remain in the sunlit world above, contemplating the Forms. So not just any enlightened philosopher, but only the enlightened philosopher who owes their enlightenment to the education that the city has provided for them, has a duty to go down into the cave and govern. But he would be wrong. Behind them burns a fire. Plato's point: the general terms of our language are not "names" of the physical objects that we can see. In stage six, the sun-contemplating philosopher first casts back on his life in the cave, and reflecting on 'what passed for wisdom there' (7.516c), smiles ruefully and feels pity for the others still trapped in their ignorance, who 'know' only the shadows on the wall or the artifacts casting them. As we have noted several times already, he thinks that 'the majority cannot be philosopher' (6.494a). When you are used to it, you'll see vastly better than the people there. 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